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 1. Introduction 
  
“Markets versus the State” has long been one of the central themes of the 
development economics discourse.  Broadly speaking, development strategies lie on a 
continuum, with more regulation of economic activity, less integration into the world 
economy, greater role for public provision of social services, more redistribution, etc., at 
one end, and the opposite at the other end.  A policy package, or development strategy, will 
reveal its orientation by where it lands on this stretch between statist and market oriented 
approaches.  Those who come down on the more statist end stress “market failure,” while 
those who come down on the market end stress “government failure.” 
  
In this paper we examine the evolution of development economics thinking in the 
post-second world war period as a constantly shifting balance between emphasis on market 
failure and emphasis on government failure.  The swing of this pendulum can be traced 
back to the pre-war period, and well before.  Development thinking in any phase was 
influenced by the experience of the immediate past—successes or failures.  The dominant 
strand of thinking was in turn challenged by new experiences and new realities.  In Section 
2 of the paper we identify three main phases in post-1945 thinking—the immediate post-
war period where statist strategies reigned supreme, the era of the Washington Consensus 
in the 1980s and 1990s, which represented a market oriented reaction to this orthodoxy, 
and the current phase where the pendulum has swung back in the direction of the statist 
dominance of the 1940s and 1950s. 
  
However, the current phase of thinking has elements that take us beyond the simple 
state versus market pendulum swings, important as they are.  In Section 3 we take up a 
strand of development economics thinking which has come to the fore in the last two 
decades.  This is the shift from a technocratic perspective on the balance between market 
and government failure to the political economy of policy making and strategy.  Which 
policies get chosen, and how they get implemented, reflect the balance of political power in 
a country, and we will not fully understand choice of strategy without understanding these 
basic forces.  Indeed, to the extent that government failure is the result of these political 
forces, we cannot understand a key component of the old debate either.  
  
 The “state” in the development economics discourse has been the nation state, and 
most of the discourse on economic strategy in the balance between market and state has 
been centered on the nation state, its policies and its strategies.  But the nation state in the 
conventional sense is now facing two challenges—one global and the other local.  Section 
4 introduces the issues that arise as we look out from the nation state in these two 
directions—the need for cross-national coordination to address externalities across 
countries and international public goods, and the need for addressing growing sub-national 
disparities within nation states, disparities which could undermine the legitimacy of the 
state in the “market versus state” debate. 
  
Section 5 concludes the paper by asking whether there are in fact revolutions in 
development strategy and thinking, or whether evolution is more likely to be the order of 
the day. 
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 2. The Evolution of Development Thinking and Outcomes since 1945 
 
2.1 Development Thinking Pre-1945 
 
 The focus of this paper is on development economics in the post-second world war 
era.  There was of course thinking and writing about economic development before 1945. 
One can go right back to the classics, such as Ricardo’s analysis of the joint determination 
of accumulation and income distribution, an analysis that was refreshed in the immediate 
post-war era by Arthur Lewis (1954).  Or one can find in the neoclassical analysis of Alfred 
Marshall “the hope that poverty and ignorance may gradually be extinguished, derives 
indeed much support from the steady progress of the working classes during the nineteenth 
century.” (Marshall, 1961, p.3)  
 
But it is in the early part of the 20th century, especially in the inter-war period, that 
one begins to see a focus in the rich countries on the problems of poor countries or, in 
many cases, poor colonies of rich empires.  The economic reports of the League of Nations, 
including on territories with mandates and other areas, began a discussion of low incomes 
and investment needed to raise them.  The colonial powers themselves could be said to be 
taking a “developmental interest” in their colonies, although the interests of the metropole 
were always central: 
 
“From about the turn of the century, the UK Government began to take a slightly 
more active interest in colonial economies, and a variety of committees studied education, 
the use of natural resources, and similar topics in selected colonies….In 1929, for the first 
time, provision was made for assisting colonial governments to develop their economies by 
means of grants and loans for what is now called ‘infrastructure’; for improving transport, 
research, power and water supplies, land surveys, and so on. Education was excluded, and a 
strong subsidiary aim of the new Colonial Development Act of 1929 was to promote 
employment in Britain by stimulating the colonial economies and their demand for British 
exports. Funds therefore had to be spent on British products as far as possible.” (Little and 
Clifford, 1965, p. 31). 
  
In 1943, in the middle of the Second World War, the Colonial Economic Advisory 
Committee (CEAC) was set up by the Colonial Office, and none other than Arthur Lewis, a 
28-year-old lecturer at the London School of Economics, was recruited to be its secretary 
(Mine, 2006).  The exchanges between Lewis and Sydney Caine, head of the Economic 
Division of the Colonial Office are instructive, and the debates seem very modern.  As 
Lewis wrote of Caine in a confidential memorandum in 1944, just prior to resigning from 
the CEAC: 
 
“….he is a religious devotee of laissez-faire, and his headship of the Economic 
Department at this juncture is fatal. . . . [his approach] is fatal not only in the decisions he 
makes, especially on secondary industry, on marketing and on co-operative organisation, 
but also in the appointments he recommends to important jobs in the Colonies, for which 
he chooses almost invariably people as laissez-faire as himself.” (Quoted in Mine, 2006, p. 
335). 
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Of course the debates between Caine and Lewis reflected wider debates on state 
versus market. If there is any surprise it might be that the laissez faire view persisted so 
strongly in the inner reaches of government into the mid-1940s, being reminiscent of the 
“Treasury view” which Keynes battled in the 1920s and 1930s.  The generally accepted 
consensus is that this view was discredited by the economic disasters of the interwar 
period, and a more interventionist, state-led view of economic policy in general, and 
development policy in particular, was dominant by the time the war ended. 
 
2.2 A Global Perspective on the Balance between Market and State 
 
 The discipline of economics in general, and the sub-discipline of development 
economics in particular, emerged from the Second World War with a deep concern about 
market failures as a hurdle to rapid development and growth.  The classic paper by 
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943, 1944) highlighted these concerns, focusing on lack of 
development as the result of coordination failure, and the need for state intervention to 
coordinate the “big push”.  We have already referred to the thinking of the young Arthur 
Lewis in the 1940s, which eventually crystallized into his Nobel Prize-winning paper 
(Lewis 1954) on development with surplus labor.  A slew of other publications, such as 
Myrdal’s (1968) monumental Asian Drama, testify to this mind set in development 
economics thinking. 
 
 Policy reflected this thinking nationally and internationally.  Surprising as it may 
seem now, the World Bank’s assistance in the 1950s and 1960s supported state-led 
industrialization. Reflecting, and leading, the evolution of India’s Five-Year Plans was the 
steady increase in emphasis given to poverty reduction directly, through phases such as the 
focus on rural development and on “basic needs” (ILO, 1976).  The World Bank’s 
President, Robert McNamara, gave a celebrated speech (McNamara, 1973) emphasizing 
poverty, and the Vice-President for Development Economics and his team published a 
book (Chenery et. al. 1974) entitled Redistribution With Growth.  The greater focus on 
poverty seemed to strengthen the case for the role of the state in development strategy.  
 
 Alongside India, countries in Africa and Latin America were very much in tune 
with these global perspectives.  In a speech to the United Nations in 1957, Ghanaian 
President, Kwame Nkrumah, said that, because institutions in his country were so weak, 
Ghana had to rely on state-led development.  Houphouet Boigny, who would soon be his 
counterpart in Cote d'Ivoire, disagreed:  because institutions in his country were weak, he 
would rely on market-led development.  Despite this "West African Wager", both 
countries, as well as most of Africa, adopted strategies with a strong role for government.  
The disappointing performance has been called "Africa's growth tragedy."  By the 1980s, 
Africa's slow growth and high poverty were attributed to excessive and inappropriate 
government intervention in the economy (World Bank, 1982). 
 
 Meanwhile, the success of the export-led East Asian “tigers” in delivering 
historically unprecedented growth together with falling or at least stable inequality, with 
substantial poverty reduction as the result, raised major questions on the inward-looking  
strategy in India and globally.  The growth success of China through opening up and 
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liberalization, albeit with rising inequality, also raised questions on the inward looking 
import substitution strategies favored in the immediate post-war period.  It should be noted, 
however, that the role of the state in the success of East Asia and China has been much 
debated.  Freeing up of some controls has been emphasized by some, but the role of the 
state in guiding exporting industries through credit and other instruments has been 
emphasized by others.  The lesson from these experiences is not necessarily a light state but 
a pragmatic, efficient state as the basis for development.  Be that as it may, the fall of the 
Berlin wall in 1989 seemed to be the final verdict on the type of central planning that went 
on behind it.  
 
 The 1980s thus culminated in a shift away from concern with market failure 
towards a concern with government failure—the seeming inability of statist strategies to 
deliver sustained growth and poverty reduction.  Williamson (1990) captured this shift in a 
list of policy positions he argued constituted the Washington Consensus. Some of the 
points in his list (for example, a more equitable distribution of public expenditure, see 
Kanbur, 2009) may surprise those who are familiar only with summaries of the 
“consensus”.  Nevertheless, by and large the consensus does represent a move towards the 
market oriented end of the spectrum of policy stances, and the shift which started in the 
1980s continued into the 1990s. 
 
 A certain triumphalism accompanied this swing in the pendulum. Fukuyama (1992) 
spoke of “the end of history”, meaning that all previous debates had been settled, and that 
market economics (and liberal democracy) had won the day.  However, as is already clear 
from India, and would have been clear in light of the long arc of development thinking, 
such declarations were premature.  As Kanbur (2001) noted, “the end of history lasted for 
such a short time.”  No sooner had the Washington Consensus been announced, indeed 
even before it was formulated, the arguments against it began to coalesce, driven by a 
number of development outcomes of the market oriented 1990s and 2000s: (i) the East Asia 
financial crisis of 1997, driven by liberalization of international capital flows, (ii) the 
“shock therapy” experience of many Eastern European economies' transition to market in 
the1990s, (iii) the poor growth performance of Latin America and Africa in the 1980s, even 
after having adopted the tenets of market liberalization, (iv) the fact that India and China 
had not, in fact adopted full-throated market liberalization, especially on their international 
capital accounts, and yet had delivered high growth rates in the 1990s, and (v) the sharp 
rise in inequality that accompanied several fast-growing countries in the 1990s. 
 
 These challenges to the Washington Consensus were in turn absorbed in 
development thinking to produce a swing back to a better balance between state and 
market, but without returning all the way to the statist strategies of the immediate post-war 
phase.  The Growth Commission of the mid 2000s, whose members included leading 
policy makers from developing countries, captured this emerging consensus well 
(Commission on Growth and Development, 2008): 
 
“In recent decades governments were advised to ’stabilize, privatize and liberalize.’ 
There is merit in what lies behind this injunction—governments should not try to do too 
much, replacing markets or closing the economy off from the rest of the world.  But we 
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believe this prescription defines the role of government too narrowly.  Just because 
governments are sometimes clumsy and sometimes errant, does not mean they should be 
written out of the script.  On the contrary, as the economy grows and develops, active, 
pragmatic governments have crucial roles to play. ” (p. 4) 
 
“The Commission strongly believes that growth strategies cannot succeed without a 
commitment to equality of opportunity, giving everyone a fair chance to enjoy the fruits of 
growth.  But equal opportunities are no guarantee of equal outcomes. Indeed, in the early 
stages of growth, there is a natural tendency for income gaps to widen.  Governments 
should seek to contain this inequality, the Commission believes, at the bottom and top ends 
of the income spectrum.  Otherwise, the economy’s progress may be jeopardized by 
divisive politics, protest, and even violent conflict.  Again, if the ethical case does not 
persuade, the pragmatic one should.” (p. 7)  
 
 The Growth Commission’s report was published before the global financial crisis of 
2008.  The caution against the simple injunction to “stabilize, privatize, and liberalize” can 
only be stronger in the second decade of the new millennium. 
 
2.3 Beyond State and Market 
 
 Our account of post-war development thinking and policy has focused, by design, 
on the debates between market oriented and state oriented development strategies.  This 
debate, as we have seen, dates from before the war, is still at the core of the development 
discourse, and will no doubt continue.  However, there is a key element in the debate which 
was not present in pre-war or immediate post-war thinking, or indeed for the first three 
decades after the Second World War.  This is the role of civil society. 
 
In Devarajan and Kanbur (2007), we have argued that between market failure and 
government failure is an area that is the domain of civil society: 
 
“When markets do not work well, the economic system generates outcomes that are 
not efficient, nor need they be equitable. … If the interventions that are needed in theory 
can be implemented by a benevolent, informed and competent government, market failure 
can be easily overcome.  Of course in reality, governments are not fully benevolent, 
informed, or competent….This is government failure.…just because there is some market 
failure does not mean that all markets fail all the time.  Just because there is some 
government failure does not mean that all government fails all of the time.  Moreover, even 
when markets and government both fail, perhaps especially when they both fail, sometimes 
civil society organizations step in and provide services and activities that fill the 
gap….However, the gap is not filled completely, by a considerable margin—otherwise the 
record on poverty reduction would be stronger and more widespread.  This is civil society 
failure.” (pp. 379-380). 
 
Three examples can illustrate what we have in mind (these are discussed in greater 
detail in Devarajan and Kanbur, 2007).  
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There is clearly market failure in the credit markets for poor people in many 
developing countries.  This failure has been the rationale for government interventions in 
credit markets.  But alongside these government schemes one finds microfinance initiatives 
led by civil society organizations like Grameen in Bangladesh and SEWA in India.  This is 
partly because the government schemes display key features of government failure—
incompetence and corruption. Civil society has stepped in to fill the gap.  
 
As another illustration, Self-help groups in Andhra Pradesh, the Rural Support 
Program in Pakistan and the National Solidarity Program in Afghanistan are all examples 
of partnerships between government and civil society to help deliver government programs 
that attempt to overcome market failures, but to deliver these while minimizing government 
failures.  
 
A third example is that of Citizen Report Cards in Bangalore, where an NGO, the 
Public Affairs Centre, collected and collated information about the quality of public 
services and then publicized this to put pressure on local government to do better.  Such a 
perspective clearly takes us beyond the simple state-versus-market dichotomy that 
dominated so much of the post-war debate on development.  It changes the question to 
what can improve the functioning of the state even as the state tries to improve the 
functioning of markets. 
 
Civil society is now a player in the development discourse in two senses.  First, its 
role in directly correcting market failures, and its role in addressing government failures, is 
the centerpiece of much development thinking.  Second, civil society is itself engaging in 
the development debates, bringing their ground level experience to bear on matters which 
were previously thought to be the domain of technical analysis.  The heated exchanges 
between Arthur Lewis and Sydney Caine on laissez faire versus state intervention in 
development policy were carried out behind closed doors.  Today the debate would be 
between Lewis, Caine, and Ela Bhatt, the founder of the Self Employed Women’s 
Association (SEWA) in India, or Mohammed Yunus, the founder of Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh. 
 
The greater involvement of civil society in development debates raises another 
aspect of the evolution of development thinking on markets and the state.  The debates 
reviewed so far have been somewhat technocratic in nature, concerning a range of policies 
that would be adopted, and if adopted then implemented well.  But the political process 
through which the policies were adopted and implemented, whether for good or ill, have 
not been explored.  A greater awareness of the political economy dimension of 
development policy making is a characteristic of the current phase of development 
thinking. We turn now to a closer examination of this dimension. 
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 3. Politics and Policy 
 
 The previous sections have described a stylized process by which development 
economics thinking translates into policies that in turn lead to outcomes; and then, in light 
of these outcomes, the thinking is revised and policies adjusted accordingly.  The truth is 
that all three—thinking, policies, and outcomes—are influenced, if not driven, by 
underlying political forces and institutional incentives.  In this section, we attempt to 
explain the emergence, persistence and transitions in development policies, drawing on 
recent research on politics and institutions in development. 
 
 The pre-war colonial era bias towards laissez-faire--which Arthur Lewis rebelled 
against--could be attributed to what Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) call "extractive 
institutions."  The colonial powers wanted to extract from the colonies as much resources 
as possible, as efficiently as possible.  Minimizing government intervention, with little 
regard for equity, would come close to maximizing efficiency.   
 
 The heavy government intervention after independence in South Asia and Africa 
was partly a reaction to the laissez-faire of the colonial era.  Now that India was 
independent, so the argument went, it would develop its own industry, rather than be the 
supplier of raw materials to British industry.  But this does not explain the persistence of 
the state-led model for so long, especially in the wake of anemic growth and poverty 
reduction. 
 
 The period of statist intervention was sustained, and eventually abandoned, because 
of politics and institutions.  In the case of India and other democracies, although growth 
was slow, the policies and regulations, including import controls, created huge rents in the 
domestic economy.  These rents were shared between the few industrialists who were 
fortunate enough to receive import protection (and monopoly power in the domestic 
economy) and the highly-educated civil servants who had discretion in implementing 
policies, such as issuing import licenses.  Inasmuch as these two groups constituted most of 
the elites of society, they commanded considerable power.  Furthermore, in heterogeneous 
societies like India, with (at least then) a strong caste system, the prevailing Fabian socialist 
principle of free, public provision of basic services like health and education did not 
translate to universal access to these services.  Doctors and teachers, who were themselves 
part of an educated elite, did not want to treat or teach those of a different caste.  The result 
was that health and education levels of the poor remained low, further increasing the 
premium for the educated elite. 
 
 In non-democracies, such as the military dictatorships in Africa in the 1960s, 1970s, 
and 1980s, the state-led model persisted, but for slightly different reasons.  To stay in 
power, military leaders needed to curry favor with those who might overthrow them.  This 
included other military officers (who may launch a coup d’état similar to the one that 
brought the current dictator into power), as well as the urban elites, who may support such 
an attempted takeover.  One way to keep these groups satisfied is to ensure that food and 
import prices were low (Bates, 2008).  Accordingly, these countries maintained overvalued 
exchange rates and subsidies or controls on food prices.  These policies discriminated 
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against producers of food and exports (most of which were in agriculture), which was the 
majority of poor people in the country.  Bates (1981) offers a further explanation for this 
“urban bias”, which rests on the idea that industrial products are more differentiated, so that 
it is easier for producers of specific manufactured goods to mobilize for protection (and 
harder for consumers to register the impact of protection on the prices they face), whereas a 
more homogeneous commodity like food requires millions of farmers to organize and 
demand protection. 
 
 If this statist model of development was a political equilibrium, how did it change?  
While individual circumstances differ, a common feature was that almost every country 
faced an external shock, such as the oil price spikes of the 1970s (or the price collapse of 
the late 1980s), and the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, which made the 
current policy regime unsustainable.  The shocks triggered a balance of payments crisis 
(which had already been brewing, thanks to the overvalued exchange rates).  The knee-jerk 
response to the shocks, imposing exchange controls for instance, exacerbated the problem.  
Moreover, the East Asian countries, which had liberalized their trade regimes earlier, fared 
better during the shocks (Balassa, 1985). Lacking intellectual legitimacy and rents to 
capture, the elites either lost power (as in Ghana) or had to re-think their development 
strategy (as in India).  Those that had been advocating for more market-oriented policies 
were now given more credence.  And because it was a balance of payments crisis, external 
organizations, especially the IMF and World Bank, became important players. 
 
 Despite being triggered by a crisis and supported by a volume of academic work, 
the transition to more market-based policies was by no means smooth.  First, because the 
balance of payments support was being provided by the IMF and World Bank, the 
accompanying policies or “structural adjustment programs” were seen as externally 
imposed.  Political protests ensued, policy reforms were reversed or not enacted at all, and 
some countries found themselves in worse circumstances than before the crisis.  As 
Devarajan, Dollar and Holmgren (2001) show, the problem was not that these were the 
wrong policies.  Rather, it was that they were designed from outside the country (usually in 
Washington, DC), which made it difficult to build a domestic political consensus around 
them. Desperate for the money, governments agreed to the “conditions” but did not 
implement them because the political costs were too high1.  Countries such as Uganda, 
Ghana and Tanzania, where the reform program was designed from within, with 
widespread consultation in the country, were able to sustain reforms, and register strong 
growth rates.   
 
 Secondly, even for reforms designed in the country, there were problems 
particularly with trade reform.  In addition to the usual phenomenon of losers (protected 
industrialists and government bureaucrats) colluding to resist reforms, there was an issue 
with exporters—who would normally benefit from the reform—because of the uncertainty 
associated with entering new markets (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991).  Uncertainty about 
whether they would be winners or losers led people to vote against reforms, resulting in a 
                                                 
1 A further problem was the behavior of the donors.  Knowing that a withdrawal of funds would leave these countries in disastrous shape, 
the international financial institutions continued to provide assistance.  The countries quickly learned this.  For example, the World Bank 
issued three structural adjustment credits to Kenya for the same agricultural price reform (Devarajan, Dollar, and Holmgren [2001]).   
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status-quo bias in reform programs.  However, when the initial bias was so extreme, as in 
Ghana with a severely overvalued exchange rate, and there was political competition (also 
in Ghana since 1992), then there was widespread support for reforms that shifted the terms 
of trade in favor of agriculture (Bates and Block, 2012). 
 
 Notwithstanding the difficulties in the transition, most developing countries by the 
early 2000s had transformed into macroeconomically stable, market-oriented economies.  
Trade barriers had come down; there were fewer state-owned manufacturing enterprises; 
and so on.  In a sense, these countries had adopted the Washington Consensus, but rather 
than being imposed from outside, it was increasingly developed from within.  Their 
strategies were expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, which were written by the 
government, based on widespread consultation.  The substantial increase in political 
competition in Africa contributed to the reform momentum (Chauvet and Collier, 2009).  
Furthermore, these countries were experiencing rapid economic growth—5-6 percent a 
year in Africa, 8-9 percent in India.   
 
 Nevertheless, this growth was not reducing poverty fast enough.  India’s rate of 
poverty decline was the same as before the 1990 reforms; fast-growing Tanzania saw only 
a slight decline in poverty during the 2000s.  One reason was that agricultural productivity 
growth was still quite limited in Africa and South Asia (where the gains from the green 
revolution had dissipated).  Another was that there was little growth in productive 
employment.  About 70-80 percent of the labor force remained engaged in low-productivity 
informal farms or household enterprises.  Finally, human development was lagging.  Africa 
and most of South Asia had stubbornly high child mortality rates.  While primary 
enrolment rates were soaring, learning outcomes were disappointing.  And India had about 
double the child under-nutrition rate of Africa. 
 
 These indicators confirmed the worst suspicions of the anti-globalizers.  It looked as 
if market liberalization had led to the rich getting richer and the poor poorer.  In India, 
electoral sentiments appeared to be moving back to the center.  An alternative 
interpretation is that the problems with agriculture, employment and human development 
have to do with government failures that were not tackled during the first wave of reforms.  
For instance, the high level of subsidies to farmers in southern Indian states (estimated at 
one percent of state GDP) crowd out much-needed public investment in agriculture, 
resulting in slow productivity growth.  But these subsidies are politically sensitive:  any 
politician who attempts to reduce them is likely to lose the next election.  Likewise, formal-
sector employment growth is hampered in India by restrictive labor regulations and in 
Africa by infrastructure constraints.  The latter too are the result of policies and regulations 
that are politically difficult to reform.  And the weak human-development indicators has a 
lot to do with poor service delivery—absentee teachers and doctors, leakage of public 
funds—that are in turn a reflection of politically powerful teachers and doctors unions who 
remain unaccountable to poor citizens (World Bank, 2003). 
 
 Given that they represent a new political equilibrium, even in countries with 
competitive elections, these government failures will be difficult to overcome.  Some 
solutions, such as increasing the accountability of service providers by tying their pay to 
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performance, have shown encouraging results (Basinga et al., 2011).  But these can only be 
attempted if they have political support.  If the underlying political system is distorted by 
clientelism, then the only way to get reform may be by informing the public about the costs 
of these distortions, so they can bring pressure to bear on politicians for reform.  Even this 
approach may not always work (Keefer and Khemani, 2012), but there is scope, especially 
with the widespread use of cell phones in these countries, so that citizens can be better 
informed, and in turn inform elected officials about their views. 
  
 4. Looking Ahead: Markets and State in the Global and the Local Context 
 
 Having described and interpreted the evolution of development economics thinking 
in terms of balancing market and government failure, we now look ahead and ask how this 
debate will play out in the future.  Our view is that the nature of both states and markets—
and hence of their failures—will change over time. 
 
4.1 The Nation State at the Confluence of the Global and Local 
 
The nation state has been at the foundation of development debates.  The implicit 
assumption in much of the development policy discourse, from the Second World War 
right up to the present, is that the policies being discussed and debated are national policies. 
Whether it is monetary stability, fiscal balance, trade liberalization, public expenditure, 
etc., the policies are applied by the national government, taking into account global 
conditions but without regard to the repercussions on other nations. 
 
There are at least two senses in which the nation state being the fulcrum of policy is 
problematic.  First, when a nation is large its policies have a direct impact on other 
countries.  Chinese exchange rate policies or reserve accumulation policies of emerging 
markets are examples.  Second, even if each country is small, the collectivity of their 
actions can impact the group as a whole.  An example of this is when each country attempts 
to grow by exporting the same commodity—the expansion of global supply leads to a fall 
in the price of the export, hurting all countries together.  
 
More generally, as cross-border trade, investment and migration have expanded, 
and as environmental resources come under stress, externalities from one country’s actions 
to another country’s wellbeing have multiplied and intensified.  Managing these spillovers 
requires policies at the level above the nation state, and yet we do not have those structures 
in place.  Rodrik has gone further and posited a trilemma for the world economy:  
  
“I have an "impossibility theorem" for the global economy…. [D]emocracy, 
national sovereignty and global economic integration are mutually incompatible: we can 
combine any two of the three, but never have all three simultaneously and in full…. 
Pretending that we can have all three simultaneously leaves us in an unstable no-man's 
land.” (http://rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2007/06/the-inescapable.html).  
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Looking outward globally from the nation state is only one of two perspectives.  
The other, of looking inwards at the components of the nation state, has been and always 
will continue to be important.  In The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the 
Nation State, the historian Basil Davidson assessed the colonial legacy to Africa—a 
collection of artificial states formed more for the convenience of, and through bargaining 
among, colonial powers. The Berlin Conference of 1884-85 left a map of Africa whose 
straight lines reflect the arbitrariness of the nation states at independence.  These states had 
to develop a national identity, adopt mechanisms to give effect to national policies and 
manage the politics of these policies.  If it took Europe more than a century to solidify the 
Westphalian state, why would we expect Africa to do it any sooner? 
 
Today, the nation state is coming under greater pressure from within, particularly in 
large nations that have ethnic, religious, historical, geographical and other cleavages.  How 
national level policies are formulated and implemented, have to take into account their 
impact on local jurisdictions.  These twin departures from the conventional focus on the 
nation state, one toward the global and one toward the local, form the focus of this section 
of the paper. 
 
4.2 International Public Goods 
 
 Let us start with some basic economic theory of public goods.  A “pure public 
good” is defined as one which is “non-rival” and “non-excludable” in consumption.  By 
non-rival is meant that consumption by one does not reduce the amount available for 
another.  By non-excludable is meant that it is in fact not possible to exclude anyone from 
consuming that good. National defense would be a concrete example of a pure public good. 
All citizens are equally and simultaneously defended from foreign attack, and no citizen 
can be excluded from such defense.  Exchange rate policy is another example of a national 
level public good—all citizens are simultaneously affected by it, and no citizen can be 
excluded from its impact.  Somewhat more abstractly, the symbols of “national identity”—
the flag, the national anthem—are public goods.  In practice many goods are only “impure 
public goods” since they only partially satisfy the conditions of non-rivalry and non-
excludability.  But the sharp formulation of a pure public good is analytically useful. 
 
 Basic economics teaches us that markets will supply inefficiently low levels of 
public goods (Cornes and Sandler, 1996).  This market failure is one of the major 
arguments for state intervention in a range of activities.  This includes activities to mitigate 
externalities, spillovers from one individual’s actions to another which are not meditated 
through markets.  Such mechanisms to address externalities, for example a coordination 
mechanism to manage deforestation, are themselves public goods—the mechanism by 
definition applies equally to all.  It follows that such mechanisms will also be 
undersupplied by the market, leading to an argument for state intervention. 
 
 The basic structure of analysis at the level of the individual can be translated up one 
level by replacing the community of individuals in a nation state by the community of 
nations in the world as a whole.  What nations do--their national policies--have spillover 
effects on other countries that are not fully mediated by markets?  Refugees, greenhouse 
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gases, deforestation, underground water exploitation, infectious disease immunization, 
financial regulation, etc. are all cross-national externalities in an integrating world 
economy.  Mechanisms to address these many externalities are public goods.  Markets will 
undersupply these public goods.  What is needed then is the equivalent of a state at cross-
national level to provide the public goods that are the coordinating mechanisms to manage 
cross-border externalities.  Without them, global development and well being will be lower 
than it would be otherwise. 
 
 Cross-national coordinating mechanisms will of course mean giving up of some 
national sovereignty in deciding some national policies, as in Rodrik’s trilemma.  One 
solution is to not have as much “hyper-integration” in the world economy: 
 
 “I am skeptical about the global governance option…There is simply too much 
diversity in the world for nations to be shoehorned into common rules…The only 
remaining option sacrifices hyperglobalization.” (Rodrik, 2011, pp. 203-204). 
One can make three observations about the comment above.  First, there is still something 
to be said for at least some cross-national coordination.  Second, as Rodrik recognizes, 
some aspects of globalization may now be beyond us to “walk back”, linked as they are to 
technological and social changes.  Third, where walking back is possible, this will itself 
require international coordination. 
 
 There are two further aspects of the public good of international coordination that 
need to be emphasized.  First, some cross-border spillovers are not necessarily to do 
entirely with global economic integration.  Greenhouse gas emissions or deforestation 
would be issues even if there were less hyperglobalization.  Second, Rodrik’s focus seems 
to be primarily on global spillovers and global public goods.  There are often spillovers and 
externalities between neighboring countries within a region—for example vector borne 
diseases in Africa, or countries that share a common water table—which require a more 
localized, but still cross-national coordination. 
 
 Viewing the evolution of the development discourse as an ever shifting balance 
between state oriented and market oriented strategies, as we have done in this paper, comes 
up against an interesting variation in the case of International Public Goods.  Public goods 
at the national level are of course ones where market failures are inherent, and perhaps 
where attempts to supply public goods through the state led to government failure.  But 
International Public Goods are also a case where there is clearly market failure, but the 
experience of international non-market provision is limited, because the experience of 
international coordination is limited.  Perhaps strong instances of international government 
failure will arise when we try such mechanisms, but we cannot know until we try. 
 
4.3 Sub-National Pockets of Poverty 
 
 The terrain of development has shifted significantly, especially in the last quarter 
century.  The conventional classification of countries is in terms of their Gross National 
Income per capita using the World Bank’ Atlas method.  The latest available classification 
is using data for 2010: (i) Low Income Countries (LICs), less than $1,005, (ii) Lower 
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Middle Income Countries (LMICs), $1,006-$3,975, (iii) Upper Middle Income Countries 
(UMICs), $3,976-$12,275, and (iv) High Income Countries (HICs), more than $12,276. 
Strong growth in a number of large developing countries has moved them from LICs to 
LMICs. Countries that have made this transition include India, Indonesia, Ghana, Zambia, 
Philippines, etc.  China is now an Upper Middle Income Country, as is Thailand. Brazil, 
Mexico and other Latin American countries are also UMICs, and South Korea is a HIC. 
Mexico and South Korea are members of the OECD. 
 
 If development were to be defined by increasing per capita national income, the 
world can point to considerable success in the post-war period.  However, there are two 
features of this global picture that sound notes of caution.  First, there is a group of 
countries stuck in a low income trap for a number of reasons including conflict and 
political fragility.  Second, even within countries that have exited from the LIC category, 
significant numbers of people languish in poverty.  Using official definitions, Sumner 
(2012) establishes the following stunning stylized fact.  Twenty years ago, 90% of the 
world’s poor lived in LICs. Today, 70% of the world’s poor live in MICs.  In other words, 
the vast bulk of the world’s poor now live in non-poor countries. In nation states that have 
succeeded according to the conventional definition of development, there are significant 
pockets of poverty.  
 
The pockets of poverty almost invariably have a geographical nature.  Spatial 
disparities are and always have been a feature of development the world over.  These 
disparities have intensified in the past two decades in almost every developing country 
(Kanbur and Venables, 2005).  This divergence of economic performance within nation 
states can be linked to globalization, which has led to sharper expression of comparative 
advantage within each nation state.  In Mexico, regions furthest away from the U.S. border 
have lagged behind; in India, states with an educational advantage have raced ahead; in 
Indonesia, the outer islands have not done as well as the core; in China, coastal provinces 
have performed more strongly relative to inland ones. 
 
When the pockets of poverty align with cleavages such as geographical divisions, 
which are themselves the product of history, the nation state itself may be challenged.  The 
challenges come along a spectrum from political activities by regional parties, through 
claims for greater regional autonomy, to outright wars of secession.  Even where political 
dissent cannot be expressed in the open, the ruling elite has to address it one way or 
another.  Examples of such tensions are abundant.  In China, the Western provinces have 
significant Islamic and ethnic minority populations. In India, pressures to split up large 
states into smaller entities are constant, and have been conceded periodically—for example, 
the new states of Uttarakhand, Jharkhand, and Chattisgarh, and ongoing agitations for a 
new state of Telengana.  In Ghana, Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire, the north-south divide 
coincides with a religious divide and regional economic balance, and is central to political 
balance and viability.  In large federations such as Brazil, regional disparities are prominent 
in the political discourse. 
 
We thus come to an issue which is largely missing from the “market versus state” 
spectrum which has structured so much of the development discourse in the post-war 
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period: whether the state itself can survive as currently structured.  The question of “too 
much state” or “too little state” becomes moot if divisions within the state lead to 
challenges to the legitimacy of the state.  Indeed, if the divisions within the state are 
intensified with a market-oriented development strategy, then the state which adopted this 
market-oriented strategy may be called into question.  Paradoxically, perhaps, we need the 
state to maintain regional balance and legitimate the nation state, through which a national 
policy of market oriented reforms can in turn be legitimated!  This certainly puts the 
“market versus state” debate in a new perspective, a perspective that is likely to endure in 
the coming decades. 
 
5. Conclusion:  Revolutions or Evolution in Development Thinking? 
 
To those engaged in the cut and thrust of development debates, the twists and turns 
seem large and significant.  The turn towards market oriented development strategies in the 
1980s appeared to both supporters and opponents as “revolutionary”.  For Fukuyama 
(1992) these shifts were epochal in the right direction. For others the “neo-liberal” or 
“Washington Consensus” strategies were equally epochal but in the wrong direction. 
However, viewed in the perspective of the long arc of development thinking, stretching 
back to the Second World War, the inter-war period, and before, these decadal shifts appear 
as relatively small adjustments 
 
In fact, it would be difficult to identify “revolutions” in the progression of 
development thinking that we have described in this paper.  Rather, what we have seen is 
the pendulum swinging back and forth between two visions of development strategy, where 
each swing absorbs key features of the challenges to the previous dominant mode of 
thinking and converts itself into the next consensus waiting to be challenged.  New 
challenges and issues may appear, such as the increasingly important role of civil society, 
but older issues do not entirely disappear.  Mechanisms such as state intervention in 
agricultural research, discussed by Arthur Lewis in his challenges to Sydney Caine, which 
became orthodoxy in the next phase but were then dethroned in the phase thereafter, are 
once again present as policy possibilities. 
  
Development economics thinking does not seem to have revolutions in the sense of 
Kuhn’s (1962) “scientific revolutions” which sweep all in their path and establish a new 
discourse and completely new ways of thinking.  This is perhaps because, as argued by 
Bronfenbrenner (1971), the evolution of economic thinking itself cannot be seen in these 
terms: 
 
“Ptolemaic astronomy, phlogistonic chemistry, and humoral medicine are examples 
from natural sciences….But in economics, where are their equivalents?  Currently 
fashionable incomes-policy proposals are based on elements of the medieval justum 
pretium… .A French physiocrat or économiste of the eighteenth century is brain brother to 
an American agricultural fundamentalist of the twentieth.  The Keynesian and the Hicksian 
crosses—paradigms in the most literal sense of the term—have supplemented but never 
displaced the Marshallian cross of supply and demand.  The quantity theory of money, 
once considered moribund, has been resuscitated, after a brief trance, by Professor Milton 
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Friedman and his Chicago colleagues.  Economic paradigms, economic “normal science”, 
both display a certain tenacity Kuhn has not found in the natural sciences across the 
quadrangle.” (p. 2). 
  
Bronfenbrenner goes on to characterize the progression of economic thinking as 
being more dialectical in nature.  The thesis of the dominant paradigm is under continuous 
challenge from a range of antitheses, which are not necessarily in agreement with each 
other.  The synthesis involves the paradigm modifying itself by absorbing some but not all 
of these challenges, many of which live to fight another day.  This synthesis becomes the 
thesis for the next phase, and new and old challenges act as the antitheses as circumstances 
change and issues arise.  We have certainly seen this in our brief assessment of the post-
war development economics discourse. The market versus state debate has gone back and 
forth, ever constant but also ever changing.  If there is a synthesis now it is perhaps one that 
has learnt the lessons of the overzealous embrace of markets at any cost, but one that is not 
prepared to go back to the simple nostrums that state intervention can solve everything. 
This synthesis now faces challenges to the notion of role of the state itself, and so the 
evolution continues.  
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